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Code criminel (L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-46) en ligne, à jour au 15 octobre 2014


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R. c. Turpin Heppell (Article 129, entrave d'un agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions et Article 270, voie de fait contre un agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions)[modifier]

R. c. Turpin Heppell, 2016 QCCS 3133 (CanLII)

Cour superieure du Québec...

Un agent de la paix ne peut pas arrêter quelqu'un pour une infraction d'un règlement municipale sauf sous de circonstances spécifiques,(soi refus de s'identifier ou si c'est le seul moyen raisonnable à faire cesser la commission de l'infraction), et si il le fait, il n'est pas en execution de ses fonctions et des chefs d'entrave et voie de fait contre en agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions ne peut pas réussir. L'arrestation ne respectait pas les règles du code de procédure pénale, en comprenant le devoir d'informer une personne du motif de l'arrestation en vertu de l'article 82 du code de procédure pénale. De plus, on a le droit de résister à une arrestation illégale.


Passages pertinents :

[41] À la suite de son analyse, le juge de première instance en arrive à la conclusion que le policier Bordeleau ne se trouvait pas dans une situation qui lui permettait de déroger à la règle que lui impose la loi, soit d’informer l’intimé des motifs de l’interpellation.

[42] Le juge de première instance tire cette conclusion vu son appréciation des circonstances de l’intervention policière : le policier aurait pu, avant de se saisir de l’intimé, l’informer des motifs de son intervention et exiger de lui qu’il déclare ses nom et adresse, comme le prescrivent les articles 72 et 73 C.p.p. Avant l’arrivée du policier derrière lui, l’intimé n’était pas en train de s’enfuir. La contravention au règlement municipal avait déjà pris fin.

[43] En fait, le policier aurait même pu passer devant l’intimé pour l’intercepter. Il a choisi de procéder autrement. Il est, et non l’intimé, à l’origine immédiate de la situation qui, selon lui, a failli dégénérer.

[48] Dans R. c. Plummer[12], la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario, après avoir conclu qu’un policier avait outrepassé ses pouvoirs en procédant à l’arrestation d’un motocycliste écrit :

[48] Because there was no power of arrest, the arrest of the appellant was unlawful. ...

[49] Further, in attempting to arrest the appellant without legal authority, the officer unlawfully assaulted him. The appellant was [page545] therefore not guilty of the included offence of assault. Section 34(1) of the Criminal Code gave him the right to resist the unlawful assault by the officer provided the force used was not intended to cause death or grievous bodily harm and was no more than necessary to defend himself. There was no suggestion that the force used by the appellant in resisting the arrest was capable of depriving him of the defence in s. 34(1). A similar analysis applies to the other charge of assault with intent to resist arrest. Since the appellant was unlawfully assaulted he had a lawful right to resist the arrest.

[49] En l’espèce, la question de la « légitime défense » a été évoquée lors de la plaidoirie en défense.

[50] Le juge de première instance a déterminé, à bon droit, que le policier Bordeleau a outrepassé les limites de son pouvoir d’intervention que lui imposent les articles 72 et suivants C.p.p. dans le cadre d’une contravention à un règlement municipal.

[51] Il a accepté que l’intimé voulait se défaire de l’emprise du policier et qu’il n’a utilisé, pour ce faire, que la force raisonnable dans les circonstances. Il a conclu que l’appelante n’a pas prouvé, hors de tout doute raisonnable, que la légitime défense ne s’appliquait pas."

Protection de la jeunesse — 12198 (Article 129, entrave d'un agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions et Article 270, voie de fait contre un agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions)[modifier]

Protection de la jeunesse — 12198, 2012 QCCS 3082 (CanLII)

Cour superieure du Québec

Un agent de la paix ne peut pas arrêter quelqu'un pour une infraction d'un règlement municipale sauf sous de circonstances spécifiques, (soi refus de s'identifier ou si c'est le seul moyen raisonnable à faire cesser la commission de l'infraction) et si il le fait, il n'est pas en execution de ses fonctions et des chefs d'entrave et voie de fait contre en agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions ne peut pas réussir. Une personne a le droit de légitime défence contre une arrestation illégale.


Passages pertinents :

[16] The provisions of the Code of Penal Procedure[2] are central in this case because the legality of the police intervention depends on the powers afforded by the law. It may be that the appellant's puzzlement with the decision may come from the omission to consider these powers. The trial judge's focus and decision were certainly on the actions of the police while the Crown's focus is on the conduct of the respondent.

[21] One must never lose sight that the Officer Hyppolite was enforcing a by-law and not the Criminal Code. When Officer Hyppolite grabbed the respondent and that others came quickly to assist him, the police was arresting the respondent for a by-law offence, something they are not empowered to do except in specific situations provided by the law. There can be no doubt that the Officer Hyppolite was, at that point in the bus, arresting the respondent.

[23] Indeed, the Supreme Court agreed with Lord Diplock's definition of an arrest as being « a continuing act [that] starts with the arrester taking a person into his custody, (sc. by action or words restraining him from moving anywhere beyond the arrester’s control), and it continues until the person so restrained is either released from custody or, having been brought before a magistrate, is remanded in custody by the magistrate’s judicial act. »[5].

[24] The question is the limit of what officer Hyppolite could do and how he did it. The entire legislative scheme must be analyzed. The law is clear that if a police officer has no power to arrest, therefore, he is not in the execution of his duty and there can be no obstruction according to 129 Cr.C. In R. v. Sharma, the Supreme Court reminded that a legal authority to enforce a by-law does not give a general power to arrest.

[25] The case of R. v. Plummer[6], is instructive. The Court of Appeal of Ontario stated that the police must follow the steps carefully curtailed in the law before the power to arrest is triggered. In that situation, it was found that the police illegally arrested a taxi driver when the latter refused to provide his driver's licence. In fact, the law provided that the police had to request another reasonable identification before an arrest could be made. Not having made that request, the Court concluded that the police illegally arrested the driver.

[26] The principles of R. v. Plummer are equally applicable to our circumstances. Officer Hyppolite was enforcing a by-law and thus, he had to rely on the powers afforded by the Code. Nobody argued another legislative source provided him with additional or different powers to arrest. When the trial judge concluded that the respondent did not understand what he had done wrong (see above, par. [10]), he was applying ss. 72 and 73 C.P.P.

[27] In Quebec, the legislative choice was to delineate the powers of the police in order to prevent as much as possible the arrest of a non-criminal offender, except if necessary for a stated purpose. The legislative scheme is indeed very specific.

[30] Evidently enough, there is no general power to arrest without a warrant a person in order to enforce the by-law. On the contrary, there was a deliberate legislative choice not to permit an arrest except in certain conditions. On the facts of this case, they do not exist. As the Supreme Court puts it in R. v. Sharma, «[t]he power of arrest cannot be derived as a matter of common law from the officer's duty to enforce the by-law given the legislature's definition of what such enforcement entails. »[7] The respondent had no obligation to do anything, and he was even authorized to resist the unlawful arrest[8].

R. c. Sharma, 1993 (Article 129, entrave d'un agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions)[modifier]

R. c. Sharma, [1993 1 RCS 650, 1993 CanLII 165 (CSC)]

Décision de la Cour Supreme concernant l'article 129 du Code criminel, « entrave contre en agent de la paix ».

Un agent de la paix qui applique une infraction qui n'existe pas en droit n'est pas en execution de ses fonctions et ainsi on peut pas se trouver coupable ni d'entrave ni voie de fait contre un agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions. Ceci peut être une infraction qui était trouvé invalide en raison de sa inconstitutionalité.

D'ailleurs, un agent de la paix qui ne respecte pas les pouvoirs d'arrestation, dans ce cas quand il s'agit d'appliquer un règlement municipale, n'est pas en execution de ses fonctions. Appliqué au Québec, les arrestations qui ne respectent pas les balises des Articles 72 à 75 du Code de procédure pénale. Une personne ne peut pas se trouver coupable d'entrave ni voie de fait contre un tel agent de la paix en execution de ses fonctions


Passages pertinents :


L'arrêt R. c. Biron, précité, ne portait pas sur le pouvoir d'arrêter sans mandat lorsque des agents de police s'estiment en train d'appliquer une loi qui est, par la suite, jugée ultra vires. L'arrêt Biron traite de la perpétration apparente d'une infraction, non d'infractions apparentes, ce qui fait qu'on ne saurait l'invoquer pour conférer à la police le pouvoir de porter contre quelqu'un une accusation d'entrave lorsqu'il y a violation apparente d'une loi qui est elle‑même invalide.


À mon avis, le juge Arbour a eu raison de conclure que, même si l'art. 11 du règlement 211‑74 de la Communauté urbaine était valide, la police ne peut pas contourner l'absence de pouvoir d'arrestation pour la violation du règlement, en ordonnant à quelqu'un de cesser de commettre la violation, pour ensuite l'accuser d'entrave. Le pouvoir d'arrestation en vue d'appliquer le règlement ne saurait être déduit du texte clair de la Loi sur les municipalités et de la Loi sur les infractions provinciales, qui prévoit des moyens plus modérés de traiter les infractions répétées. L'agent n'avait pas le pouvoir, en common law ou en vertu de la loi, d'arrêter l'appelant pour refus d'obtempérer à l'ordre de mettre fin au comportement interdit par le règlement. Le pouvoir d'arrestation sans mandat pour désobéissance à l'ordre de mettre fin à un comportement interdit par l'art. 11 du règlement 211‑74 de la Communauté urbaine ne saurait reposer sur le texte du règlement 211‑74 de la Communauté urbaine, pas plus que sur les art. 3 et 23 de la Loi sur les infractions provinciales ou sur l'art. 57 de la Loi sur la police. L'arrêt Johanson c. The King, précité, ne s'applique pas en l'absence d'une obligation légale d'obéir aux agents de police. En l'espèce, l'agent de police était effectivement tenu d'appliquer le règlement. La législature a défini le pouvoir d'application de la loi comme consistant à donner des contraventions aux contrevenants, et l'appelant n'a pas gêné l'agent de police dans l'exercice de cette fonction. Le pouvoir d'arrestation ne saurait, sur le plan de la common law, découler de la responsabilité de l'agent d'appliquer le règlement, vu la définition que la législature donne de ce que comporte une telle application de la loi. Les propos que tient le juge Arbour, à la p. 170, sont pertinents:

... À mon avis, un policier ne peut éluder le choix délibéré du législateur de ne pas permettre l'arrestation pour ce genre d'infraction municipale, en ordonnant à l'accusé de mettre fin au comportement qui constitue un manquement au règlement et, de ce fait, exposer l'accusé à la responsabilité de l'infraction d'entrave prévue au Code criminel et déclencher ainsi l'exercice des pouvoirs d'arrestation prévus à l'art. 495 du Code

R. v. K.S.H.W., 2006 (Article 129, entrave d'un agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions)[modifier]

R. v. K.S.H.W., 2006 CanLII 36223 (MB PC)

Décision de la Cour provincial de Manitoba concernant l'article 129 du Code criminel, « entrave contre en agent de la paix ».

Un agent de la paix qui refuse de donner son numéro de matricule ne peut pas citer la persistence du défendeur de le savoir comme preuve d'entrave.


Passages pertinents :

[31] On cross examination Constable Pohl confirmed that H.-W. had stated “I want your badge number; I have a right to know.” She didn’t provide him with her badge number. She testified he made two further requests for her badge number and she didn’t respond to his request at any time. She acknowledged that citizens have a right to know her badge number, saying she had no time, but admitting that it only took about two seconds to state that number.

[83] Dealing with H.-W.’s conduct, I cannot conclude that even if the Crown’s allegations were established, that H.-W. advanced towards Constable Pohl shouting swearing and demanding her badge number, such conduct amounts to obstruction. It is common ground that he was demanding the Constable’s badge number, and she repeatedly refused to give it to him. He had a lawful right to this information.

R. v. Stewart, 2000 (Article 129, entrave d'un agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions et Article 175, tapage... indirectement, l'article 1 du Règlement P-1 à Montréal (RRVM c. P-1 Article 1)[modifier]

R. v. Stewart, 2000 CanLII 2941 (MB PC)

Décision de la Cour provincial de Manitoba concernant l'article 129 du Code criminel, « entrave contre en agent de la paix » et l'article 175 du code criminel, tapage...

Un agent de la paix qui fait un erreur de droit n'agit pas en execution de ses fonctions et ainsi une arrestation portée en raison de cette erreur est illégale. D'ailleurs, une personne ne peut pas se trouver coupable en vertu des articles 129 ou 270 du code criminel. Aussi, chanter une chanson qui critique la police sur la place public ne constitue pas l'infraction de tapage.

Aussi, on a besoin de preuve d'entrave de pietons pour se faire trouver coupable de quoique infraction dont un élement essentiel est l'entrave de pietons.


Passages pertinents :

[12] Apparently registering their displeasure with the day’s events and the role of the police in it, they began to sing their own version of the nursery song “Old MacDonald Had a Farm”. Their version was not particularly imaginative. They sang that “ . . . on this farm he had some fucking pigs.” Their version found favour with some passers by and within a very short time 15-20 people gathered in front of the street musicians to join in the chorus. Occasionally the musicians and their chorus substituted the words “fascist pigs” for “fucking pigs”. The same lyrics continued, and the crowd sang or chanted along. Sometimes the chant was “pigs, pigs”. The sidewalk was about 8-10 feet in width, and the gathered crowd filled the sidewalk area.

[13] The Officers got out of their car and asked the musicians to stop singing and playing their guitars and to move along. While they had no particular difficulty getting through the crowd to speak to the musicians, their requests that the musicians cease and desist were ignored. The offensive lyrics continued.

[14] The officers then immediately arrested the accused and his companion for causing a disturbance, seized their guitars and put them in the trunk, and placed the two street musicians in the cruiser car after a cursory pat down search.

[39] Thus, something more than the mere use of abusive language is generally required to create a disturbance. Case law supports the proposition that abusive comments shouted at police (or anyone else) do not in themselves constitute the offence of cause disturbance. See for example R v. Peters (1982) 1982 CanLII 422 (BC CA), 65 C.C.C. (2d) 83 (B.C.C.A.), and R. v. Eyre (1972), 10 C.C.C. (2d) 236 (B.C.S.C.)


[41] In the context of the scenario before the court, the Crown argued that the disturbance created in the case at bar was the obstruction of the sidewalk. The Crown argued that the need to put an end to this obstruction justified the arrest. When pressed, the Crown took the position that had the musicians been singing “O Canada” rather that the offensive lyrics, an arrest would have been equally justified.

[42] It must be remembered that Officer Koniuck, one of the two arresting officers said she did not see anyone being impeded. Officer Evans did state that he observed some pedestrians who had to step around the gathered crowd. The focus of his concern, however, was clearly the content of the offensive lyrics, and in particular the use of the “f” word. As noted above, he stated his belief, in effect, that swearing simpliciter, in a public place, constitutes the offence of cause disturbance. He stated unequivocally that he would not have arrested the accused if the musicians had been singing their “protest song” without using the swear word. This is evidence that any sidewalk obstruction was minimal and insignificant, which would explain why it went unnoticed by Officer Koniuck. In addition, if the real concern was the obstruction of the sidewalk, one would think the officers would have at least brought this to the attention of the accused and the crowd, and endeavoured to get them to rearrange themselves so as to allow pedestrians clear passage. Rather, the officers simply told the musicians to “stop singing”.


[43] Moreover, the officers appear to be mistaken in their understanding of the nature of the offence of cause disturbance – in particular the requirement for an externally manifested disturbance. If a proper appreciation of its elements is lacking, how could the officers come to a proper subjective determination that the offence was “apparently” being committed?

[44] In any event, I find that obstruction must be significant enough to block or substantially hamper other persons in getting from one place to another before it attracts penal consequences under s. 175. There was no basis for a reasonable person to conclude that this was the situation in the case before me.

[45] I find that the arrest was unlawful. While there was evidence of shouting and swearing, a reasonable person in the position of these officers could not reach the conclusion that there was a reasonably foreseeable, unlawful discernible disturbance which resulted from this conduct.

R. v. Potvin 1973 (Article 129, entrave d'un agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions)[modifier]

[ R. v. Potvin (1973), 15 C.C.C. (2d) 85 (Que. C.A.)]

Décision de la Cour d'Appel du Québec concernant l'article 129 du Code criminel, « entrave contre en agent de la paix ».

Un agent de la paix qui applique une infraction qui n'existe pas en droit n'est pas en execution de ses fonctions et ainsi on peut pas se trouver coupable ni d'entrave ni voie de fait contre un agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions.


Passages pertinents :

"The constable may have been right in his opinion that boating on Beaver Lake is contrary to the public interest. It may be that if the City's by-laws do not prohibit this they ought to. The duty of the the police is not, however, to legislate but to enforce the laws as they exist."


R. v. Johnsgaard, 2003 (Article 129, entrave d'un agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions, Article 270, voie de fait contre en agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions)[modifier]

R. v. Johnsgaard, 2003 ABPC 165 (CanLII)

Décision de la Cour provinciale d'Alberta concernant l'article 129 du Code criminel, « entrave contre en agent de la paix ».

Un agent de la paix qui aide un autre agent de la paix avec une arrestation illégale est également pas dans l'execution de ses fonctions et ainsi on ne peut pas se faire trouver coupable d'entrave ni voie de fait contre un agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions.

Une person n'est pas obligé de circuler à la demande d'un agent de la paix si cette demande n'a pas appuy d'une loi ou règlement quelconque, et certainement pas quand ils s'sgit d'arrestations illégales.


Passages pertinents :

[26] Is she in the lawful execution of her duty when she is acting as cover for another officer who is affecting an illegal arrest or an arrest without reasonable grounds or who is using excessive force to affect the arrest? If the arrest of Ms. Bonet is illegal and excessive, Mr. Meroda or anyone else is entitled to stop it by intervening as long as they do not use excessive force. Therefore, the arrest or prevention of Mr. Meroda for helping to free Ms. Bonet from her illegal arrest is also illegal. It seems to me that if an officer is assisting another officer to affect an arrest by providing cover for him to act illegally or without reasonable grounds or to use excessive force, that officer cannot be in the lawful exercise of her duty. Once a police officer acts illegally, the protection to police officers under the Criminal Code is removed.


[27] The next element I will deal with is whether there was an obstruction of Constable Kraushaar by the accused. The accused was clearly shocked and appalled by the conduct of Constable McKenzie toward Ms. Bonet and Mr. Meroda. Ms. Bonet had already escaped by the time he took any action. His action was to try to convince Constable McKenzie he was being watched or videoed in an attempt to curb the excessive force he believed Constable McKenzie was using on Mr. Meroda. He was also attempting to get close enough to Mr. Meroda to get his name and let him know he would be his witness. When this did not work, he approached Constable Kraushaar to see if he could obtain Mr. Meroda’s name when it was all over. Her reply was that it would be in his best interest to move along. I accept Constable Kraushaar’s evidence that the accused never left the area, always remaining on the sidewalk against the wall and never went more than a couple of steps in either direction. That evidence is confirmed by the accused except that after he moved around the big black male, he went out on the street. I suspect Constable Kraushaar did not observe this and was not watching the accused by this time. Constable Kraushaar said the accused never moved toward them. Again, this is corrected by the accused’s own evidence that he bent over Mr. Meroda in an attempt to obtain his name. However, Constable Kraushaar was not concerned with the accused getting involved. She was only concerned that he was distracting her attention from providing cover for her partner, Constable McKenzie. That, in my view, is not enough to amount to an obstruction. The accused was entitled to stand on a public sidewalk and observe. He was entitled to be concerned with what he perceived as police brutality. He was also entitled to attempt to curb the excessive force he believed Constable McKenzie was exerting on Mr. Meroda. In my view, if the accused’s actions are interfering with Constable Kraushaar’s providing cover and distracting her attention, then anybody on the sidewalk doing anything could be said to be interfering if it caused her to divert her attention. I do not find these actions amount to an obstruction.


[28] It could also be said the accused obstructed by not obeying the commands of the police officers to move along or go home. In my view, in these circumstances, that is not an obstruction. I refer to the comments in Lykkemark, supra, that it is not an offence simply to not do what one is told to do by a police officer. To be culpable the demand must be rooted in a power given to the police in law. It is not enough to be rooted in a general power such as to preserve the peace or prevent crime. A citizen is not obliged to blindly follow any direction or order by a police officer such that failure to do so would amount to obstruction of that police officer. If an officer is going to interfere with a citizen’s right to circulate freely on a public street, he must have articulable cause. In the facts in Lykkemark, supra, a noisy party complaint with two or three hundred people in and around the house, many not invited, it is clearly appropriate to demand people to leave. There is a rational connection between the complaint and the people on the street and on the premises. They are the cause of the breach the police are trying to contain. In the circumstances of the case before me, there is no such connection. I do not find an obstruction merely because he was told to move along and failed to do so. The demand was not responsive to some need that was so apparent that non-compliance amounted to obstruction.


[29] The third element is that the accused must be wilfully obstructing. This is the mens rea of the offence and only requires a general intent. The mens rea is present when an accused knows what he is doing and intends to do it. Clearly the accused knew what he was doing and intended to do it. However, did he intend to obstruct? I do not believe he did. He certainly, in my view, did not intend to obstruct Constable Kraushaar. His intent was to curb excessive force by Constable McKenzie and to assist Mr. Meroda by offering to be a witness. I have already found that this is not an obstruction. Therefore he had no intent to obstruct.



R. v. Murphy 1981 (Article 129, entrave d'un agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions)[modifier]

[ R. v. Murphy (1981), 58 C.C.C. (2d) 56 (NSSC A)]

Décision de la Cour supreme de la Nouvelle-Ecosse, division appel, concernant l'article 129 du Code criminel, « entrave contre en agent de la paix ».

Un agent de la paix qui fait un erreur de droit en appliquant une disposition n'est pas en execution de ses fonctions et ainsi on ne peut pas se trouver coupable d'entrave ou voie de faits contre un agent de la paix en execution de ses fonctions. Ici, la personne fut accusé d'ivresse dans une place public, et elle clairement n'etait pas dans une place publique, elle était dans un immeuble residentiel.


Passages pertinents :

The accused was charged with resisting peace officers in the execution of their duty... as a result of his actions in resisting arrest of being in an intoxicated condition in a public place... The accused was found by police in an upper hallway of an apartment building in a drunken condition. Access to this hallway was gained by going up a narrow staircase and then through an unlocked door...

The arrest by the police officers in this case was unlawful and therefore they were not in the execution of their duty and therefore the accused was entitled to resist that arrest. A peace officer would be entitled to arrest a person and that person would not be justified in resisting arrest if the person was merely "apparently" committing an offence. However, there was nothing in the circumstances of this case from which the officers could reasonably infer that the hallway where the accused was found appeared to be a public place.


R. v. Houle, 1985 (Article 129, entrave d'un agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions)[modifier]

R. v. Houle, 1985 ABCA 275 (CanLII)

Décision de la Cour d'Appel d'Alberta

Un agent de la paix qui applique une infraction qui n'existe pas en droit n'est pas en execution de ses fonctions et ainsi on peut pas se trouver coupable ni d'entrave ni voie de fait contre un agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions.


Passages pertinents :


[6] Special offences relating to interference with police officers are a recognition of the responsibilities and duties of those officers. They are a recognition of the authority of a peace officer, acting in the execution of his duty, to interfere with a citizen’s liberty. In this case the interference may be classed as trivial but that is beside the point. Would a peace officer arresting for a non-existent offence be acting in the execution of his duty?

[7] In Ludlow and Others v. Burgess [1971], Crim. L.R. the English Divisional Court held of an officer’s action in detaining someone for inquiries that “the detention of a man against his will without arresting him was an unlawful and serious interference with a citizen’s liberty. Since it was an unlawful act it was not an act done in the execution of the constable’s duty.” A similar conclusion was reached in Kenlin and Another v. Gardiner and Another, [1966] 3 All E.R. 931. In Murphy (1981). 58 C.C.C. (2d) 56, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal concluded that a peace officer was not acting in the course of his duty, and emphasized the Crown’s onus to establish that fact, in a case in which the officer had inadequate factual grounds for concluding an offence was being committed. In Slipp (1970). 1 C.C.C. (2d) 275 (N.B.S.C.A.D.), the police were not executing their duty when arresting under an erroneous interpretation of a statute. Finally, in Johanson (1947), 89 C.C.C. 305 the Supreme Court of Canada acquitted an accused charged with obstruction under a by-law which forbad standing or loitering on any street so as to obstruct or interfere with traffic, when the evidence fell short of establishing that the accused was “standing or loitering in the manner prohibited by the by-law”. None of these authorities deal with the situation in which the peace officer was mistaken as to the existence of the law, but all find the police not acting in the execution of their duty where the essential fact substrata did not exist.

[8] Here, the legal substratum does not exist, a graver deficiency. ... In balancing the two competing interests that must be considered in determining the extent of the peace officer’s duty, namely, the protection of police authorities as against individual liberty, I would resolve the competition in favour of the citizen. I would not interpret police duties and powers as extending to the enforcement of non-existent law. I would not extend the duties to embrace actions taken in ignorance of the law - an ignorance which does not excuse the citizen and should not protect the peace officer. To extend the duty to the extent contended for by the Crown would have that effect.

R. c. Cossette Viau (Article 129, entrave d'un agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions)[modifier]

R. c. Cossette Viau, 2013 QCCM 159 (CanLII)

Décision du juge Discepola de la Cour municipale de Montréal concernant l'article 129 du Code criminel, « entrave contre en agent de la paix ».

Le juge décide que durant une manifestation, la police doit s'attendre à ce que les gens soient moins coopératifs que dans des autres contextes et que plus est requis pour que des gestes soient considérés comme entrave.

Québec (Ville de) c. Desaulniers (Article (Article 129, entrave d'un agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions)[modifier]

Québec (Ville de) c. Desaulniers, 2012 QCCM 284 (CanLII)

Décision du juge Cloutier de la Cour municipale de Québec concernant une entrave contre en agent de la paix en vertu d'un règlement municipal ainsi qu'une accusation d'ivresse.
Le juge explique les circonstances sous lequel le citoyen est obligé de s'identifier et quand la police a le droit d'arrêter quelqu'un en vertu du Code criminel ou du Code de procédure pénale.
Les arrestations peuvent se faire en vertu de règlements municipaux seulement quand on ne s'identifie pas après avoir été informé de l'infraction en question, ou si la personne est en infraction et une arrestation est le seul moyen de terminer la perpétration de l'infraction.
De plus, le juge Cloutier nous démontre que quand l'arrestation est illégale, le policier n'agit plus dans le cadre de ses fonctions, ce qui signifie que des accusations d'entrave contre un policier au cours de ses fonctions (art. 129 Code criminel) et voie de fait contre un policier au cours de ses fonctions (art 270) doivent se conclure avec des acquittements.
Quant à l'infraction d'ivresse, il « ne s'agit donc pas d'une consommation très importante d'alcool (6 bières) sur une période de 5 heures ».

Bédard c. R. (Article 129, entrave d'un agent de la paix en exercise de ses fonctions)[modifier]

Bédard c. R., 2009 QCCA 1473 (CanLII)

Décision de la Cour d'appel du Québec concernant des condamnations en vertu de l'article 129 du Code criminel (entrave contre en agent de la paix), l'article 430 du code criminel (méfait) et l'article 175 du code criminel (tapage).
Les juges décident qu'une manifestation ne constitue pas d'une "action concertée" en vertu de l'article 21((1) du Code criminel qui s'agit de l'aide et l'encouragement... ce que la juge Baribeau de la première instance a utilisé pour condamner les manifestants en raison de leur présence sur les lieux.
L'article 129 du Code criminel (entrave d'un agent de la paix) exige une intention spécifique et non une intention générale.
Cette infraction était considérée plus souvent comme une infraction d'intention générale avant cette décision. Pour être trouvé-e coupable d'une infraction d'intention générale, il suffit d'avoir l'intention de poser le geste qui cause le résultat. Pour être trouvé-e coupable d'une infraction d'intention spécifique, on doit prouver l'intention de produire le résultat.

Passages pertinents :

« Pour être trouvé coupable d'entrave au travail d'un agent de la paix au sens de l'article 129 a) C.cr., la poursuite doit faire la preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable que l'accusé a volontairement entravé le travail d'un agent de la paix dans l'exécution de ses fonctions ou lui a résisté en pareil cas. Le mot « volontairement » a déjà été interprété par la Cour suprême comme exigeant la présence d'une intention en relation directe avec le but prohibé. Il faut donc, en conséquence, que le contrevenant ait eu ce but prohibé à l'esprit lorsqu'il a posé le geste reproché ».